Ideas from 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' by Robert C. Stalnaker [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ways a World Might Be' by Stalnaker,Robert C. [OUP 2003,0-19-925149-5]].

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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts

16423

Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of

16422

The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary

16421

Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

16429

A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

16428

Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

16432

One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics

16430

Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension

16431

In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content